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Abstract
We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance
when voters can top up with private insurance, saving and family help. Agents
di¤er in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help,
and amount of family help received. Social insurance redistributes across income
and risk levels, while private insurance is actuarially fair.
The income-to-dependency probability ratio of agents determines whether they
prefer social or private insurance. Family support crowds out the demand for both
social and, especially, private insurance, as strong prospects of family help drive
the demand for private insurance to zero. The availability of private insurance
decreases the demand for social insurance but need not decrease its majority
chosen level. A majority of voters would oppose banning private insurance.
Keywords: long-term care, political economy, social insurance, top up, famil-
ism, crowding out, weak and strong prospects of family help, voting.
JEL classi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1 Introduction
While health care services aim at changing a health condition (from unwell to
well), long-term care (hereafter LTC) merely aims at making the current condition
(unwell) more bearable. Individuals need LTC due to disability, chronic condition,
trauma, or illness, which limit their ability to carry out basic self-care or personal
tasks that must be performed every day. Such activities are dened as activities
of daily living (eating, dressing, bathing, getting in and out of bed, toileting
and continence) or instrumental activities of daily living (preparing own meals,
cleaning, laundry, taking medication, getting to places beyond walking distance,
shopping, managing money a¤airs and using the telephone/Internet). A person
is dependent if he or she has limitations in either type.
Dependent people can draw on four di¤erent types of resources to help alleviate
their daily living problems. By far the most important quantitatively are their own
resources (self-insurance1, or savings) and family help (mainly through informal
help). Several countries also o¤er some form of social LTC insurance, although
the size of these programs is usually low, especially compared to the pension
programs. Finally, except for a handful of countries (such as the US and France),
private insurances role is negligible, and in any case consistently smaller than
that of the State.
Several articles have studied the interactions between some of these resources
(see the literature section hereunder). The value added of our paper is that it
considers simultaneously the four types of resources (family help, private, social
and self-insurance) and that it studies the political choice of the level of social LTC
insurance. More precisely, we study the determinants of the political support
for social insurance in an environment where people di¤er in income, risk and
availability of family help, and where they choose individually their private and
self-insurance levels. As stated above, the availability of family help is of rst
importance for LTC, and distinguishes our approach from the literature studying
the political support for other kinds of social insurance programs, such as health
or social security.2
We develop a framework where agents live two periods. They earn an income,
pay taxes, save and buy private LTC insurance when young. Beyond income, they
also di¤er in the probability of becoming dependent when old, in the probabil-
ity of receiving help from their family if dependent, and in the amount received
1As other papers dealing with LTC (see Costa-Font 2010 for instance), we use the general
denition of self-insurance (assets set aside to cover possible losses) rather than the more specic
meaning used in insurance theory (prevention activities reducing the severity of the potential
loss).
2For instance, over 80% of dependent elderly live in their home or with their children, and
for these people most of the care is informal. See Stone (2000).
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from the family.3 They choose by majority voting the value of the proportional
income tax rate that nances the lump sum social insurance transfer received if
dependent. A crucial assumption is that social LTC insurance redistributes across
income and (ex ante) across risk, while private insurance is actuarially fair and
not redistributive.4 To level the playing eld, both forms of insurance are equally
e¢ cient (no loading factor, no cost of public fund or distortionary impact from
taxation).5
While we endogenize the levels of the three types of insurance, family help is
modelled as an exogenous norm. This corresponds to what Costa-Font (2010) calls
familism, a short hand for familism culture, or the embeddedness in a familys
social norms (family ties)(p 2). Familism is exogenous because of the facts that
need of LTC is a non-repeated experience in human life, and that individuals are
arguably prone to make decisions on the basis of intergenerational cultural values
rather than repeatedly experienced actions. More specically, parents tend to
transfer their values to their children (...), which includes cultural norms towards
funding and providing care in old age.(p 3). For simplicity, we do not model
the distinction between formal and informal help.
We rst study the individually most-preferred (self, private and social) insur-
ance allocation of agents. We show that agents most-prefer either social or private
insurance, depending of their income-to-dependency probability ratio. Whatever
this ratio, the support for their most-preferred insurance form decreases with the
probability of receiving family help, and with the amount of this help. This is
in line with the empirical results obtained by Costa-Font (2010). We then intro-
duce the distinction between weak and strong prospect of family help: prospects
are strong (resp., weak) for a given individual if her expected marginal utility is
lower (resp., higher) when she is dependent with family as the only source of help
(i.e., without any private or social insurance handouts) than when she remains
autonomous. Social insurance happens to be more resilient than private insurance
to family help, in the sense that no one with strong prospects of family help most
3Like most related papers, we assume that the state of the world for each individual is
binary, with one being either dependent or not. In reality, there are several degrees of severity
in the state of dependence. Public and private insurance schemes use scales such as the Katz or
IADL (Independence in Activities of Daily Living) index to measure those degrees and provide
compensations accordingly. Introducing such scales in our analysis would complicate matters a
lot without bringing signicant new insights.
4From now on, we slightly abuse terminology and refer to the risk of an agent as his probability
of becoming dependent.
5Alternatively, we could have modelled public intervention as the subsidization of private
insurance premia. Such a policy also benets high-risk agents, provided that the demand for
private insurance is increasing in individual risk. Its income redistribution component is less
clear: richer agents pay more taxes, but may also consume more insurance and thus benet
more from the subsidy. We leave this analysis for future research.
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prefers any private insurance, while some of these agents may still prefer a positive
amount of social insurance. The main driving force of this result is that strong
prospects of family help cancel out any need for an actuarially fair insurance like
private insurance, while the (income and risk) redistribution embedded into social
insurance induces a positive support from low income-to-dependency probability
agents. The larger support for social insurance when prospects of family help are
strong is in line with the stylized fact that social LTC insurance is more wide-
spread worldwide and larger than private insurance in the countries where they
coexist (although both are of a small size, which can be explained by our model
as due to sizeable family help). Our model also generates a novel testable impli-
cation regarding the amount of self-insurance, which is not monotone in family
help: it rst increases with family help (as agents substitute more saving to less
insurance) but then decreases with family help when agents prefer self-insurance
to any other form of insurance.
We then show that there exists a Condorcet winning level of social LTC insur-
ance (i.e., a level preferred by a majority of voters to any other level) even though
voters di¤er in four dimensions. Voters characteristics that lead to a positive
majority chosen level of social insurance are the existence of a large fraction of
agents with low income-to-dependency probability ratios (so that the correlation
between income and risk does matter), and with weak prospects of family help.
We also study how the availability of private insurance impacts the support for
social LTC insurance. This question is of interest as countries such as France
are currently considering how to facilitate the access to private LTC insurance.
Moreover, as explained below the literature has concentrated on the opposite re-
lationship, namely the impact of social on private insurance. We obtain that,
even though both types of insurance are substitutes, so that introducing private
insurance decreases the support for social insurance by some agents, the majority
chosen level of social insurance need not decrease. The intuition for this propo-
sition is that agents prefer either social or private insurance, but never both, so
that introducing private insurance either does not change an individuals most-
preferred social insurance level, or drives it to zero. We study several cases where
individuals di¤er in one or at most two dimensions, and we obtain that the condi-
tions required for private insurance to crowd out social insurance are empirically
either not satised (when agents di¤er only in income) or very demanding. We
nally obtain that a majority always opposes a ban on private insurance, even
in the case where private insurance crowds out social insurance at the majority
equilibrium.
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1.1 Literature
As mentioned above, a rich literature has studied the interactions between private,
social and self-insurance together with family help in the context of LTC. To the
best of our knowledge, no paper takes the four forms of resources into account
simultaneously.
Both Meier (1996) and Fabel (1996) develop a two-period overlapping gener-
ations model where young individuals save and choose how much private LTC
insurance to buy. They study how these two decisions are a¤ected by various
institutional settings, such as pure private funding, social aid (where the public
sector pays the part of the cost of LTC that an individual cannot a¤ord), manda-
tory social insurance (funded or pay-as-you go) or obligatory minimum level of
private coverage. Their focus is on aggregate saving and private insurance by
a cohort, and they abstract both from family help and from the determination
of the type/size of public policy. They often obtain ambiguous results as to the
impact of the public policy on saving or private insurance.
Pauly (1990) studies various reasons why informed and risk averse agents do
not buy actuarially fair private LTC insurance. His main argument is that Med-
icaid crowds out the demand for private insurance, because it reimburses all LTC
costs (up to a threshold) once private funding is exhausted. Empirical evidence
does not appear to conrm this phenomenon (Norton, 1995; Brown and Finkel-
stein, 2007). Pauly (1990) also investigates the interactions between family help
and private insurance. He shows that the concerns for not impoverishing ones
spouse and for leaving a bequest do not always generate a positive demand for
private LTC insurance. He also studies the manipulation of bequests in order to
incentivize children to provide informal help.
Pauly (1990)s seminal approach has given rise to several analytical analyses
of this so-called intra-family moral hazard problem, by Courbage and Zweifel
(2011) and Zweifel and Strüwe (1996, 1998) among others. There seems to be
little empirical support for intra-family moral hazard: Sloan and Norton (1997)
nd that the bequest motive does not inuence the demand for private insurance
in the US, while Mellor (2001) nds no evidence consistent with the idea that the
availability of caregivers discourages parents from obtaining market-purchased
LTC insurance. Courbage and Roudaut (2008) rather nd support in French data
for an altruistic motive since LTC insurance is purchased not only to preserve
bequests and to nancially protect families in the event of disability, but also to
reduce the burden of potential informal care givers.
All these papers either abstract from social insurance or take its characteristics
as exogenous. There is surprisingly little literature on the determination of the
(socially or individually) optimal level of social LTC insurance, especially when
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compared with the related issues of health care, social security and annuities.6
On the normative side, Cremer and Pestieau (2013) use a model close to the
one of this paper; they show that the case for social LTC insurance can only be
defended when tax redistribution is restricted. On the positive side, Nuscheler
and Roeder (2013) study how the heterogeneity in individual income and risk
a¤ects the preferences for redistributive income taxation versus public nancing
of LTC. Their model allows LTC to be provided by informal help received from the
family, or through family transfers in cash and governments transfers. Insurance
(whether social, private or self-insurance in the form of saving) is not available
since voters know whether the elderly in the family is dependent or not when
taking their decisions. There is also no room for the correlation between income
and risk, since the proportion of dependent elderly is the same in the two income
classes considered. Their main result is the prediction of a negative correlation
between income inequality and public LTC spending. De Donder and Leroux
(2013) stress the behavioral biases exhibited by agents who vote for social LTC
insurance and buy LTC annuities, a nancial product that serves a higher transfer
if dependent than if not. Agents all have the same income and risk (there is no
family help) and di¤er in both the type and degree of myopia. They obtain that
the low demand for private insurance is better explained by underestimation of
the risk of becoming dependent than by procrastination.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on public provision of private
goods when individuals can supplement public provision with private purchases
i.e., top upmodels such as Epple and Romano (1996) but especially Gouveia
(1997). Gouveia (1997) models a setting where agents di¤er in income and prob-
ability of getting sick, and vote over (tax nanced) public provision of health care
that can be supplemented with private purchases. One important di¤erence with
our paper is that he models two goods (health care and a numeraire) and pub-
lic provision of health care (rather than a monetary transfer as in our setting).
Redistribution with the public scheme (from high to low income, and from low
to high morbidity) then takes place through di¤erent (tax) prices of health care,
with agents forbidden from selling the publicly provided amount of health care on
the market. He obtains a majority-voting equilibrium which, under certain condi-
tions, is of the ends-against-the-middleform, with low and high income voters
favoring a lower amount of public provision than the one obtained at equilibrium.
A common theme of Gouveia (1997) and of our paper is that a majority of voters
would oppose banning the private sector (private LTC insurance in our setting,
private health care sector in his) supplementing the public one.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
6The economic literature on various other aspects of LTC is surveyed in Cremer et al. (2009).
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describes the most-preferred social, private and self-insurance allocation of agents.
Section 4 studies the majority-chosen social insurance level. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a continuum of individuals living two periods. When young, they earn
a wage, pay income taxes, save and buy private LTC insurance. When old, they
live out of their saving, plus the social and private insurance transfers if they need
LTC, plus a transfer from the family if they have caring children and they need
LTC. There are four sources of heterogeneity among individuals i: their exogenous
income, denoted by wi > 0, their probability of needing LTC (i 2]0; 1[), their
probability of having (caring and close)7 children when needing LTC (pi 2]0; 1[),
and the amount of help from the family the agent can count on if dependent,
fi  0. An agent of type i is thus characterized by the quadruplet (wi; i; pi; fi).
A young individual is lifetime utility function is given by
Ui = u(ci) + (1  i)u(si) + i [piH(dci) + (1  pi)H(dni )] : (1)
The rst term of (1) measures the instantaneous utility of individual i when young,
while the last two terms record his utility when old (for simplicity, we assume away
any discounting of future utility). First-period consumption is denoted by
ci = wi(1  )  si   ai;
where the rst term measures disposable income when young, with  a (propor-
tional) contribution rate on labor income. The second term si is private saving,
while ai denotes the amount of private LTC insurance bought.8
In the second period of life, we distinguish the utility function when au-
tonomous (with probability 1 i), denoted by u(:); from the utility when needing
LTC (with probability i), denoted by H(:). Agents have the same instantaneous
7There are many reasons why some parents cannot count on any assistance from their o¤-
spring: (i) they do not have children or their children prematurely died; (ii) their children are
not altruistic; (iii) they migrated far away from each other; (iv) parents and children do not get
along.
8We do not model the transfer made by some young agents to their dependent parents in
the rst period of their life. This is consistent with the assumption that LTC transfers are tax
deductible, or that they take the form of informal help that has as opportunity cost foregone
income on the labor market. In both these cases, the income wi is income net of LTC transfers
to parents. Introducing explicitly the LTC transfer to parents would add a fth (and binary)
dimension of heterogeneity to our already complex model. Moreover, the role played by this
transfer would be very similar to the one played by income, so we would gain very little additional
insight.
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utility function u(:) when young and when old but autonomous. Both u(:) and
H(:) are increasing and concave functions of consumption. We assume that both
satisfy the condition of innite marginal utility for zero consumption levels. We
also assume that u(c) > H(c) for any consumption level c, but that u0(c) < H 0(c)
for all c: people are happier if not in need of LTC, but have a higher marginal
utility if dependent. Note that H(:) can be viewed as a reduced form of a utility
comprising both standard consumption and LTC spending.9
With probability 1   i, the individual remains autonomous and enjoys his
saving (without loss of generality we posit a zero interest rate on savings). If
the individual becomes dependent (with probability i), his consumption level
depends on whether he receives help from his family. He does not receive such
help with probability 1  pi, in which case his consumption level is given by
dni = si + b+ xi;
where b (resp., xi) denotes the social (resp., private) insurance benet. With
probability pi, the dependent individual receives a transfer fi from his family. As
explained in the introduction when discussing familism, we assume that fi is ex-
ogenously set by a social norm at the family level. We do not model the distinction
between formal and informal help, but rather measure fi as the monetary value
of all the help received from the family. Consumption in that case is given by
dci = si + b+ fi + xi:
The social insurance lump sum transfer b paid to all dependent agents is -
nanced by the proportional tax  on rst-period labor income. For simplicity, we
assume away demographic (and economic) growth, so that the social insurance
programs budget constraint is given by
b = 
w

; (2)
where w is the average income and  is the average probability of needing LTC
(and thus, by the law or large numbers, the proportion of old individuals who
become dependent).
We model the private insurance scheme as actuarially fair: the premium does
not depend on income but is based on the individual probability i (which is
9The assumption that u0(c) < H 0(c) is satised by denition if the advent of dependency
is associated exclusively with nancial costs. If dependency is also characterized by a change
in preferences, we enter the realm of state-dependent utility functions. The assumption that
u0(c) < H 0(c) may then be disputed (see, for instance, Finkelstein et al. 2009, 2013), since some
goods may substitute or complement good health. However, observe that if dependent people
do not have higher marginal utility than when autonomous, then the lack of demand for (social
and private) LTC insurance is not puzzling at all.
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assumed to be observable by the insurer). Since LTC need is binary, there is no
place for ex post moral hazard. Also, we assume that insurers do not condition
their payment on the transfer made by children (for instance because they cannot
observe it). Individuals can choose the quantity of private insurance that they
buy, as measured by the insurance premium ai paid in the rst period of life. In
case they need LTC, they then receive an actuarially fair amount
xi =
ai
i
:
The timing of the model runs as follows. Individuals rst choose the value of
 by majority voting. We assume that only young agents vote10 and that they
vote as if the result of the vote would continue to hold in the next period.11 They
then observe the result of the vote, and decide privately how much to save and to
privately insure against the risk of dependency. No decision is taken in the second
period of life.
3 Most-preferred public, private and self-insurance
allocation
We look for the most-preferred amounts of social, private and self insurance (re-
spectively denoted by  i , a

i and s

i ) of agents di¤ering in income wi, probability
of dependency i and family help pi and fi. The respective rst-order conditions
(FOCs) are12
FOC i : w
i


 wi
i

w
u0(ci) + EH 0i

 0; (3)
FOCai :  u0(ci) + EH 0i  0; (4)
FOCsi :  u0(ci) + (1  i)u0(si) + iEH 0i = 0; (5)
where
EH 0i = piH
0(si + b+
ai
i
+ fi) + (1  pi)H 0(si + b+ ai
i
)
10In the absence of altruism, old agents are in favor of the value of  which maximizes the
transfer b if they need LTC (or if they do not know yet whether they will be dependent later),
and are indi¤erent as to the value of  if not dependent. Their preference over  thus does not
depend on their (wi; pi; i; fi) characteristics, but simply on their dependency status. Allowing
old people to vote would then complexify the analysis without bringing any novel insight.
11This assumption is standard in the positive literature on pensions. See for instance
Casamatta et al. (2000)
12The fact that decisions are taken sequentially (rst  and then a and s) does not matter in
this section since we look at the most-preferred allocation of individual i.
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is the expected marginal utility in case of LTC of an agent of type i. Observe
that the formulation of the FOC for saving holds with equality thanks to the
assumption that limc!0u0 (c) = 1 (i.e., everyone saves a positive amount at his
optimum).
The following denition will prove helpful throughout the paper.
Denition 1 The prospect of family help of agent i is weak if
(1  pi)H 0(s) + piH 0(s+ fi) > u0(s); for s > 0;
and is strong otherwise.13
An agent faces a weak prospect of family help when his expected marginal
utility if dependent is larger than his marginal utility if not in the absence of
social and private insurance (i.e., when nancial resources are the same in both
states of the world, except for the family transfer received, with some probability,
if dependent). Family help may be weak either because the transfer fi is low or
because the probability pi to receive it is low.
We obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (i) Agents never most-prefer at the same time positive amounts
of social and private insurance (i.e., ( i > 0, a

i > 0) is impossible), except if
wi=i = w= in which case agent i is indi¤erent between the two forms of insur-
ance, provided that they add to her most-preferred total insurance level.
(ii) Individuals with a weak prospect of family help prefer some social but no pri-
vate insurance (i.e.,  i > 0, a

i = 0) if wi=i < w=, and some private but no
social insurance (i.e.,  i = 0, a

i > 0) if wi=i > w=.
(iii) No individual with a strong prospect of family help prefers private insurance
(ai = 0 for all i). Also, such agents prefer some social insurance (i.e., 

i > 0)
if wi=i < ( w=)EH 0i=u
0(ci) < w=, and no social insurance at all (i.e.,  i = 0)
otherwise.
Proof: See Appendix A
The intuition for this proposition runs as follows. Comparing the FOCs for
social and private insurance ((3) and (4)), one immediately sees that agents prefer
to use social insurance if wi=i < w=, and private insurance otherwise. The
intuition for this result is that social insurance redistributes across income and
(ex ante) across risk levels while private insurance is actuarially fair and does not
13We will assume for simplicity that the inequality has the same sign for all values of 0 < s <
wi.
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redistribute across income levels. Observe that the threshold w= is independent
(i) of family help (pi and fi), and (ii) of the correlation between income and risk
in society (i.e., it is the ratio of average income to average dependency probability,
rather than the average ratio of income-to-dependency probability, that matters).
The latter observation comes from the fact that social insurance serves a lump
sum transfer to dependent agents, with the transfer increasing in the tax base
(as measured by average income) and decreasing in the proportion of recipients
(which, by the law of large numbers, equals the average probability of becoming
dependent).
Proposition 1 also shows that everyone with a weak prospect of family help
most-prefers a positive amount of some form of insurance. Agents with a strong
prospect of family help have no need for any actuarially fair and non-redistributive
insurance, since their expected marginal utility if dependent is smaller than if
autonomous in the absence of insurance transfers. Such agents then do not buy
any private insurance (ai = 0), but they favor a positive social insurance level
if their income-to-dependency probability ratio is small enough, compared to the
ratio of average income to average dependency probability, that they benet a lot
from the (risk or income) redistribution embedded in the social insurance program.
We now proceed to the comparative statics analysis of the most-preferred
amount of insurance and of saving. We rst study the group of agents who most-
prefer a positive amount of social insurance.
We introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion R(ci) =  ciu00(ci)=u0(ci)
is low:
u0(ci) + wiu00(ci) > 0
, R(ci) < ci
wi
< 1:
Note that this assumption is slightly stronger than the assumption thatR(ci) <
1 since wi > ci.14 As we will see shortly, this assumption is used only as a su¢ cient
(although not necessary) condition to ensure that the derivative of the most-
preferred social insurance contribution rate with respect to income is negative.
14In a recent paper studying the LTC insurance market, Karagyozova and P. Siegelman (2012)
surveys the empirical literature on relative risk aversion. They report very large ranges for
empirically plausible individual values of R: from [0.35, 1] for Hansen and Singleton (1983) to
[0.029, 680] for Halek and Eisenhauer (2001). Holt and Laury (2002) estimates that two thirds
of respondents in their study have a value of R between 0.15 and 0.93. Assumption 1 then seems
reasonable.
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Proposition 2 Take the individuals with ai = 0 while 

i > 0 (and s

i > 0). We
obtain that
(i) a larger income wi increases si and decreases 

i , under Assumption 1;
(ii) a larger family help (either pi or fi) increases si and decreases 

i ;
(iii) a larger dependency probability i decreases si and increases 

i .
Proof: Repeated use of Cramers rule - see working paper version available
at http://idei.fr/doc/by/de_donder/private_social_june_2014.pdf
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 2, observe rst that saving
and social insurance are (imperfect) substitutes (since they constitute two tech-
nologies to move resources from the present into the future), so that increasing
one exogenously decreases the most-preferred level of the other, ceteris paribus.
Then, each individual characteristic (income, family or dependency probability)
impacts a decision ( i or s

i ) directly, but also indirectly through its impact on
the other decision.
We start with the impact of income, noting that wi plays a role only in the
rst period of life, since no transfer is conditioned on income when old. An in-
crease in individual income has two direct e¤ects on  i : it makes social insurance
more expensive (by increasing the tax payment), but it also decreases the mar-
ginal utility of rst-period consumption (and thus the marginal utility cost of the
social insurance transfer). If marginal utility does not decrease too fast (i.e., if
Assumption 1 holds), the rst impact is larger than the second and the net direct
e¤ect of an increase in income is to decrease  i . The only direct impact of a larger
income on the saving decision is the lower marginal utility from rst-period con-
sumption, which increases the optimal saving amount si . We then have that the
direct and indirect e¤ects of an increase in income reinforce each other: a larger
income decreases  i directly but also indirectly because it makes saving more at-
tractive. Likewise, a larger income increases saving directly but also indirectly by
discouraging social insurance.
Increasing family help (either pi or fi) decreases the expected marginal utility
in case of dependency, which exerts a negative direct e¤ect on both  i and s

i .
Indirect e¤ects have the opposite sign, as a lower  induces a higher s, and a lower
s induces a higher  . We obtain that the direct e¤ect is larger than the indirect one
for social insurance, while the opposite occurs for saving. Intuitively, increases in
pi or fi decrease the desire to insure as measured by  i . This in turn decreases the
marginal utility from rst-period consumption, and pushes the individual to save
more. In other words, more family help decreases the expected marginal utility
when dependent compared to being non dependent, and leads the individual to
reallocate his portfolio in favor of saving and against social insurance.
A larger dependency probability i directly increases  i since it raises the
probability to receive the social insurance transfer without a¤ecting its tax price.
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The direct e¤ect of a larger i on si is more di¢ cult to ascertain. It hinges on how
the expected marginal utility when old varies when agents put more relative weight
on being dependent. We know from the decision not to buy private insurance
that expected marginal utility if dependent is lower than rst-period marginal
utility. Saving then ensures that marginal utility in the rst period is a convex
combination of marginal utility if dependent and if not. We then obtain that
marginal utility if autonomous is larger than if dependent, so that increasing i
actually decreases the expected marginal utility in second period, inducing the
agent to save less. Observe that the indirect e¤ects then reinforce the direct
e¤ects: a larger probability pushes directly the agent to insure more and save less,
the latter reinforcing his incentive to insure more, while the former reinforces his
incentive to save less.
We now consider the agents who most-prefer a positive amount of private
insurance.
Proposition 3 Take the individuals with  i = 0 while a

i > 0 (and s

i > 0). We
obtain that
(i) a larger income wi increases si and has an ambiguous e¤ect on a

i ;
(ii) a larger family help (either pi or fi) increases si and decreases a

i ;
(iii) a larger dependency probability i decreases si and increases a

i .
Proof: Repeated use of Cramers rule - see working paper version available
at http://idei.fr/doc/by/de_donder/private_social_june_2014.pdf
Agents with a larger income wi have a lower marginal utility from rst-period
consumption, which gives them more incentive to buy insurance and to save: the
direct impact of wi on both ai and s

i is positive. The indirect impact then goes
into the opposite direction (since more saving induces to buy less insurance, while
buying more insurance induces to save less). We obtain that the direct e¤ect
is unambiguously larger than the indirect one for saving, so that si increases
with wi. As for insurance, the sign of the aggregate impact of wi depends on
how saving a¤ects the di¤erential of second-period (expected) marginal utility
according to dependency status. If more saving increases expected marginal utility
when dependent compared to when autonomous, then richer agents buy more
insurance. They buy less insurance in the opposite case.
The sign of the impact of family help (as measured by either fi or pi) on the
demand for saving and insurance is the same as in Proposition 2, and the intuition
is similar.
By contrast, the channels through which a higher dependency probability i
impacts the most-preferred amount of private insurance and saving di¤er totally
from the case studied in Proposition 2. Observe that, when ai > 0 and s

i > 0,
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we have that u0(si) = u0(ci) = EH 0i, so that putting more relative weight on
the dependency state does not a¤ect the expected marginal utility when old.
At the same time, increasing i decreases the return from private insurance and
thus lowers consumption levels (and increases marginal utility) when dependent.
This direct impact of increasing i then increases the willingness both to insure
privately and to save. On the other hand, indirect e¤ects have the opposite sign.
We obtain that the direct e¤ect is larger than the indirect one for private insurance,
while the opposite holds for saving. Intuitively, a larger dependency probability
increases the expected marginal utility when dependent, and leads the individual
to reallocate his portfolio in favor of private insurance and against saving.
We now put together the three propositions and summarize how individual
characteristics a¤ect separately the preferences for saving as well as for social and
private insurance, starting with income. An individual with a very low income
most-favors a positive amount of social insurance, because he benets from the
income redistribution, but no private insurance. He also saves a positive amount.
As income increases,  i decreases while s

i increases. If this individual has a weak
prospect of family help, the decline in  i as wi increases continues up to the point
where wi=i = w=. At this point, the agent shifts his support from social to
private insurance (i.e.,  i = 0 while a

i > 0).
15 From that point on, any increase
in wi has an ambiguous impact on ai . By continuity, s

i increases with wi whether
the agent prefers social or private insurance. If the agent rather enjoys a strong
prospect of family help, his most-preferred value of  i reaches zero for a value of
wi that is such that wi=i < w=. From that point on, the individual favors no
insurance whatsoever. His preferred amount of saving increases with income in
all cases.
We perform the same exercise for the dependency probability. It will prove
easier to treat separately the case of weak and strong family help prospects. With
weak family help prospects, agents with very low values of i prefer some private
insurance,16 with ai increasing with i. When wi=i = w= is reached, they
stop buying private insurance and rather switch to a strictly positive amount of
social insurance. As i further increases,  i increases as well. Saving s

i decreases
with i whether  i > 0 (see Proposition 2) or a

i > 0 (see Proposition 3). With
strong family help prospects, agents never buy private insurance whatever their
individual probability i. They most-prefer no social insurance as well, until
their dependency probability is large enough that wi=i is su¢ ciently small (and
15More precisely, an agent with wi=i = w= is indi¤erent between using private or social
insurance, as long as the insurance transfer he receives when dependent corresponds to his
optimal level.
16This is reminiscent of the well known result (see Mossin (1968)) that risk-averse agents
always wish to buy actuarially fair insurance.
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denitely smaller than w=) that they gain enough from the ex ante redistribution
across risk levels to favor  i > 0. From that point on, 

i increases with i. Also,
si decreases with i throughout with strong family help.
We now turn to the impact of family help, as measured by pi (we obtain similar
results when varying fi). Figure 1A illustrates the results when wi=i < w=
while Figure 1B assumes that wi=i > w=. A very low value of pi means that
the prospects of family help are weak for the individual. He then favors either
 i > 0 if wi=i < w= or a

i > 0 if wi=i > w=. Increasing pi then decreases 

i
(Fig. 1A) or ai (Fig 1B), and increases s

i . If wi=i > w=, then a

i becomes nil
when pi is large enough that prospects of family help turn from weak to strong. If
wi=i < w=,  i remains positive even for strong prospects of family help (thanks
to income and risk redistribution), but decreases with pi until it becomes nil.17
When pi is large enough that ai = 

i = 0 (on either Fig. 1A or 1B), s

i decreases
with pi because a higher probability of family help decreases the expected marginal
utility in the second period, and thus the expected benet from saving. We then
obtain that saving is not monotone in family help when agents endogenously
switch from some (social or private) insurance to no insurance at all at their
most-preferred allocation.
Insert Figures 1A and 1B here
To summarize, we obtain that having weak prospects of family help is a nec-
essary condition to most-prefer a positive amount of private insurance and that
family support (as measured by either fi or pi) decreases the support for both
types of insurance.18 Such strong prospects for a large part of the polity may then
explain the puzzleof the generalized lack of private insurance in OECD coun-
tries. Social insurance is less a¤ected by family help thanks to the redistribution
(across income and risk levels) that it entails. On a more prospective note, the
decrease in family help that is widely expected to happen should give a boost to
social and especially to private insurance, according to our model.
17As announced in the introduction, these results provide an analytical underpinning to those
obtained by Costa-Font (2010): compare our Figures 1A and 1B with Costa-Font(2010)s Figure
6.
18When pi and fi are low enough that prospects of family help are weak, they crowd out the
demand for social insurance by low wi=i types and for private insurance by large wi=i types.
The crowding out is exclusively at the intensive margin, since the threshold value of wi=i (equal
to w=) which determines whether agents prefer social or private insurance is not a¤ected by
fi or pi. When pi and fi are large enough that prospects of family help are strong, demand for
private insurance disappears. From that point on, any increase in family help crowds out the
demand for social insurance both at the intensive and at the extensive margins.
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Before turning to the majority-chosen amount of social insurance, we should
stress two limitations of the comparative static analysis we have performed. First,
we have looked at variations of individual characteristics that a¤ect a set of mea-
sure zero of individuals. This is of no import for family help, where the distribution
of pis and of fis plays no role for individual preferences, so that the comparative
static results we have obtained can be generalized when the characteristics of a set
of positive measure of agents are changed. Unfortunately, we cannot proceed in
the same way for variations of wi and i for a group of agents when such variations
a¤ect w and ; because of the role that average income and dependency probabil-
ity play in the governments budget balance equation (2). While we have shown
that the individual impact of increasing wi on  i is negative, any increase in the
income of a group of agents that raises the average income w would add another
e¤ect in the opposite direction since a larger tax base would increase the return of
the social insurance scheme. Likewise, the individual impact of increasing i on
 i is positive, while an increase in i for several agents that would raise  adds a
countervailing force on  i by decreasing the return of the social insurance scheme.
The second limitation of Propositions 2 and 3 is that we assume that individual
characteristics are modied one at a time (i.e., independently from one another).
In reality, these individual characteristics are correlated. Observe that, if richer
people tend to live longer and hence to have a larger probability of needing LTC
(i.e., cov(w; ) > 0), then the net impact of a higher wi coupled with a higher
i on si and 

i is ambiguous. Whether one impact is larger than the other one
is essentially an empirical matter of both the intensity of the correlation and the
amount of variance in the two characteristics. For instance, if (as we surmise), the
variance in income levels is larger than the variance in the dependency probabilities
(or if the covariance between both is low), then, under Assumption 1, richer people
will favor a lower social insurance contribution rate (even though they may face
a larger dependency probability than poorer people).
Income may also be correlated with the probability of receiving family help,
but the sign of the correlation is far from clear, depending both on the type of
data used (macro vs micro) and the type of help (formal vs informal). Using
macro data in Europe, one observes a negative correlation between income and
family support, with richer Northern European countries providing less informal
family help, on average, than poorer Southern countries (the so-called North-
South gradient, see SHARE (2005)). Focusing on micro data, Bonsang (2009)
nds a positive correlation between income and nancial help from the family.
With a positive correlation, we obtain unambiguously that richer people prefer
less social insurance, while the relationship between income and most-preferred
social insurance can go both ways with a negative correlation between income and
family support.
We now move to the majority-chosen level of social insurance.
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4 The majority-chosen level of social insurance
Young agents vote rst over  and then choose a and s. Di¤erentiating (3) with
respect to  and using the envelope theorem for the choices of a and s, it is
straightforward to see that preferences over  are concave (and thus single-peaked).
We then apply the median voter theorem and obtain that there exists a value of
 that is preferred by a majority of voters to any other value of  . We denote
this majority-chosen level of  by V . It corresponds to the value of  that is
such that at least half the polity exhibits  i  V while  i  V for at least half
as well. Since individuals di¤er in four dimensions, it is not possible at this level
of generality to dene the characteristics of the decisive voters. But this will not
prevent us from obtaining several interesting results.
First, observe that the set of agents who favor  i > 0 is made of all agents
i with wi=i < w= and a weak prospect of family help together with all agents
i with a strong prospect of family help and a value of wi=i lower than some
threshold that is itself strictly lower than w=. If the mass of those two types of
agents is at least equal to one half, then V is strictly positive.
Second, from the discussion at the end of the previous section, we obtain
that V weakly decreases with family help (either pi or fi). Unfortunately, as
explained above, we can not draw similar inferences for variations in income and
in dependency probability. Also, it is impossible at this level of generality to assess
the impact of modifying the correlation between, say, income and risk, or income
and family help, on V .
In the introduction, we mention that the literature has assessed how social
insurance may decrease the demand for private insurance. Since several coun-
tries are currently considering facilitating access to private LTC insurance, we
now study how the availability of private insurance impacts the support for social
insurance. It is easy to see from the FOCs (3) and (4) that the two forms of insur-
ance are imperfect substitutes. The intuition may then suggest that introducing
the possibility to buy private insurance in a society where such insurance did not
exist previously would always decrease the support for social insurance and result
in a lower value of V . The next proposition shows that this need not be the case.
Proposition 4 A su¢ cient (although not necessary) condition for the introduc-
tion of the possibility to buy private insurance not to a¤ect the majority-chosen
value of the social insurance contribution rate, V > 0, is that the proportion of
individuals who face weak family prospects and are such that wi=i < w= is larger
than one half.
The intuition for this proposition is that agents prefer either social or private
insurance, but never both, so that introducing private insurance either does not
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change an individuals most-preferred value of  , or drives it to zero. The two cat-
egories of agents who prefer the same positive value of  whether private insurance
is available or not are (i) those with weak prospects of family help and a ratio
of income-to-probability lower than w= (hence the su¢ cient condition above)
and (ii) those with strong prospects and very low ratios of income to probability
(so that the above condition is not necessary). The only agents who switch from
social to private insurance are those with weak prospects of family help, and an
income-to-probability ratio larger than w= but not too large that they prefer to
self-insure rather than buying any form of insurance.
To better understand how likely it is that private insurance crowds out social
insurance, we now look at specic cases where individuals di¤er only in one or
at most two dimensions. Observe rst that, as long as agents do not di¤er in
fi or pi, they all face either weak or strong prospects of family help. We then
focus on the more empirically relevant case where they all face weak prospects. If
agents di¤er only in income wi (and share the same , p and f), then the su¢ cient
condition in Proposition 4 is always satised, since all income distributions are
such that wmed < w. Likewise, if agents di¤er only in the probability i, the
condition is satised provided that med > .19 If agents di¤er in both income
wi and probability i, then the su¢ cient condition remains empirically valid if
the variance of the income distribution is, as we surmise, much larger than the
variance of the probability distribution.20 If agents di¤er only in family help
characteristics (pi and fi), then they are all indi¤erent between social and private
insurance, as long as they are not forced to consume more (social) insurance than
their most-preferred level. Private insurance would then totally crowd out social
insurance, with everyone preferring to buy his most-preferred (private) insurance
amount.
The role played by family help characteristics, and especially by whether
prospects are weak or strong, is exemplied in Appendix B, where we study the
case where agents di¤er in income wi and belong to one of two groups, with one
facing weak prospects (a low value of f and of p) and the other strong prospects (a
19We have not been able to nd empirical evidence regarding the distribution of the probablity
to become dependent.
20If agents only di¤er in either wi or i, then the only way that V can be a¤ected by the
availability of private insurance is by being driven down to zero. The reason is that the agents
who switch to a most-preferred value of  of zero when private insurance is available are those
who prefer a low value of  when private insurance is not available. This is no longer the case
when agents di¤er in two non-exclusively family related dimensions (such as wi and i, wi and
pi or wi and fi, etc.) since there is no link between whether an agent most-prefers social or
private insurance (driven entirely by whether wi=i 7 w=) and his most-preferred value of 
(depending on wi, i, pi and fi). In this latter case, the introduction of private insurance may
decrease V without bringing it to zero.
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large value of f and of p).21 We obtain that the proportion of agents facing strong
prospects of family help need to be neither too large nor too low for the introduc-
tion of private insurance to a¤ect the majority-chosen level of social insurance.
More precisely, this proportion has to be large enough that a large minority of the
population most-prefers no social insurance even when private insurance is not
available, but low enough for the weak prospect agents with larger-than-average
income to be numerous enough to join this large minority, in order to form a
majority of voters against social insurance when private insurance is available.
We now look at whether private insurance is supported by a majority of voters.
Assume that agents vote rst over whether to allow for private insurance, before
voting over  and nally choosing individually a and s.
Proposition 5 A majority always vote in favor of allowing private insurance.
Proof: See Appendix C
We show in the proof of Proposition 5 that a majority of voters favor the in-
troduction of private insurance, whether such an introduction a¤ects the majority
chosen amount of social insurance or not. As we show in the proof, some voters
may indeed vote in favor of the introduction of private insurance, even if they do
not plan on using private insurance at all, in order to decrease (or even drive to
zero) the majority-chosen amount of social insurance.
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the determinants of the demand for private, social and self-
insurance for LTC in an environment where individuals di¤er in earnings, family
support and dependency risk. We can use the results of our analysis to try and
shed light on the future development of the three types of insurance for LTC. The
two main changes expected to a¤ect LTC in the near future are (i) the doubling in
the number of dependent individuals in the next twenty years within the OECD,
associated with the rapid increase of very old (75+) people in the population, and
(ii) the decline in family solidarity due to increased participation of women in the
labor market, increased mobility and changing family values. The rst e¤ect can
be modelled in our setting as an increase in the probability of becoming dependent
of all agents. This higher probability will undoubtedly increase the needs when
old, but we obtain that it does not necessarily imply an increase in the demand
for social insurance, because a larger average probability of becoming dependent
decreases the return of the social LTC insurance. Observe that the return of
21A similar reasoning applies when agents also di¤er in i:
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the (actuarially fair) private insurance decreases with the individual dependency
probability, while self-insurance return is not a¤ected. The impact of a larger
average dependency probability on the demand for social insurance thus depends
on the probability distribution across people, and especially on its correlation with
income. The impact of a diminishing family support is easier to ascertain: as we
show, it unambiguously increases the demand for social insurance among agents
with a low income-to-dependency probability ratio. As for individuals with a high
ratio, a decrease in family help will rst increase their self-insurance level, and
then increase their demand for private insurance.
Our paper introduces an admittedly crude modelling of family help, in that
the amount of help is dictated by a social norm, with no distinction between
formal and informal help. The next step in our research agenda is to lift those
two constraints in order to better understand the demand for social and private
LTC insurance as a function, for instance, of the substitutability/complementarity
between formal and informal help (see Van Houtven and Norton, 2008).
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6 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Observe from the FOC for ai that ai > 0 implies that EH
0
i = u
0(ci).
This in turn implies that FOC i > 0 if wi=i < w=, an impossibility, and that
FOC i < 0 if wi=i > w=, so that  i = 0. In the latter case, the FOC for
saving implies that EH 0i = u
0(si) = u0(ci), which is compatible with the starting
assumption that ai > 0.
Similarly, observe from the FOC for  i that  i > 0 implies that EH
0
i =
wi
i

w
u0(ci). If wi=i > w=, we then obtain that EH 0i > u
0(ci) and so that
FOCai > 0, an impossibility. On the other hand, if wi=i < w=, we have that
EH 0i < u
0(ci) and that FOCai < 0, implying that ai = 0. Finally, it is obvious
that wi=i = w= is indi¤erent between a and  , provided that EH 0i = u
0(ci)i.e.,
that they obtain their most-preferred total insurance amount.
(ii) We rst show that people buy either private or social insurance with weak
family help i.e., that ai = 

i = 0 is impossible. In that case, with a

i = 

i = 0,
by the FOC for saving, we would have EH 0i > u
0(ci) > u0(si), which in turn would
imply that FOCai > 0, a contradiction with ai = 0. The proof of part (i) has
then shown that we have ai > 0 and 

i = 0 when wi=i > w=, and a

i = 0 and
 i > 0 when wi=i < w=:
(iii) With strong family help, when ai = 

i = 0, by the FOC for saving, we
have EH 0i  u0(ci)  u0(si), which in turn implies that FOCai  0, consistent
with ai = 0. We then have that FOC i  0 for  i = 0 provided that wi=i 
x = ( w=)EH 0i=u
0(ci) , with x  w= since EH 0i  u0(ci). If wi=i < x, then we
obtain that FOC i > 0 at  = 0, which is inconsistent with  i = 0. Observe
that EH 0i decreases with  i while u
0(ci) increases with  i. Take then the value of
 i > 0 such that the FOC for  equals zero. Observe that EH
0
i  u0(si) holds a
fortiori when  > 0 while prospects of family help are strong. Hence, from the
FOC for saving, we still have that EH 0i  u0(ci)  u0(si) and thus that the FOC
for ai is negative: we have just shown that ( i > 0; a

i = 0) is consistent with the
three FOCs.
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7 Appendix B
Assume that there are two groups of agents: those who have the same weak
prospects of family help (pi = plow and fi = flow) and those who have the same
strong prospects (pi = phigh and fi = fhigh). Agents in both groups also di¤er
in income wi, with the same distribution of income represented by the cdf F (w)
in both groups. The fraction of agents with weak prospects in the population is
denoted by .
Figure 2 represents the most-preferred value of  , as a function of income, for
both groups, when private insurance is not available. We know from Propositions
2 and 3 that   is decreasing in wi, pi and fi, so that agents with weak prospects
of family help prefer a larger value of  than agents of the same income but
with strong prospects. We denote by ws (resp., ww) the lowest income level of
agents with strong (resp., weak) prospects of family help who most-prefer no social
insurance. We know that ws < w < ww. We assume that phigh and fhigh are large
enough that ws < wmed.22
Insert Figure 2
Introducing private insurance means that agents with a weak prospect of family
help and a larger-than-average income switch from social to private insurance. We
concentrate on the conditions over  under which V decreases (i.e., is driven to
zero, as explained in footnote 20) when private insurance is introduced. The
condition under which V > 0 when private insurance is not available is
F (ww) + (1  )F (ws) > 1=2:
This condition is satised provided that  is large enough. The condition under
which V = 0 when private insurance is available is
F ( w) + (1  )F (ws) < 1=2:
This condition is satised provided that  is low enough. Putting the two con-
ditions together, we obtain that private insurance crowds out social insurance
provided that the fraction of agents with strong prospects of family help is nei-
ther too high (so that V = 0 without private insurance) nor too low (so that V
remains positive and unchanged after private insurance is introduced).
22Otherwise, a majority always prefers a positive value of  , whatever , whether private
insurance is available or not.
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8 Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 5
Three cases can occur.
(i) Allowing for private insurance does not change the majority chosen value
of  . In that case, allowing for private insurance increases the utility of the
agents who buy some (i.e., top up) at equilibrium, and leaves the utility of others
unchanged, so that nobody opposes the introduction of private insurance.
(ii) Allowing for private insurance totally crowds out social insurance (i.e.,
decreases V to zero). In that case, allowing private insurance results in a majority
of agents enjoying their overall most-preferred option (no social insurance coupled
with their individually most-preferred amount of private insurance). This majority
then supports the introduction of private insurance.
(iii) Allowing for private insurance partially crowds out social insurance (i.e.,
decreases the value of V without driving it to zero). We add the subscript a
(resp., ;) to V and to   to describe the majority-chosen and individually most-
preferred values of  when private insurance is (resp., is not) available. We show
that all agents with  a < 
V
a < 
V
; are better-o¤when private insurance is allowed
(since Va is the majority-winning value of  in that case, these agents then form
a majority). If  a = 

; > 0, then the agent prefers social to private insurance
anyway, and thanks to the concavity of his utility function he prefers the value of
 closest to  a i.e. he prefers 
V
a to 
V
; and favors allowing private insurance as
a way to decrease the equilibrium value of  . If  a = 

; = 0, then the agent wishes
to buy neither social nor private insurance, and is better o¤with the lower value of
Vi.e., when private insurance is allowed. Finally, if  a = 0 < 

;, then allowing
for private insurance has two benecial impacts on this individuals utility. First,
keeping  = V; and allowing for private insurance can only increase this agents
utility (in the case he tops up social with private insurance). Second, once private
insurance is allowed, this individuals utility is decreasing in  (since  a = 0 and
since his utility is concave in ) so that he benets from the reduction from V; to
Va , and votes in favor of allowing private insurance.
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